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Essay
Firearms and Protest: Lessons from the Black
Tradition of Arms
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON
Kenosha was no aberration. Our history is filled with episodes of righteous
protest boiling over into violence. Where violence is imminent, our traditions and
laws allow innocents to use corresponding violence in self-defense. This
arrangement is imperfect and demands hard thinking about how to refine and
possibly improve it. One source of lessons toward this end is the experience of Black
freedom fighters who navigated turmoil that dwarfs our current troubles. The
principles that guided their struggle help frame a sphere of legitimate gun use
during periods of civil unrest. These principles emerge from a considered
philosophy and practice of arms developed by a people who have a long history of
confronting violent threats that the state has been unable or unwilling to stop.

953

ESSAY CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 955
I.

EMPATHETIC FRAMERS ............................................................... 957

II. A TIME-TESTED MODEL ............................................................... 964
III. THE APPEAL OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT DEFENSE
POLICY AS A GUIDEPOST FOR THE MODERN
CONVERSATION ABOUT THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE ARMS DURING CIVIL UNREST. ................................... 973
A.
B.
C.
D.

SUBMISSION OR RESISTANCE ........................................................ 974
THE FORBIDDEN ZONE ................................................................. 981
THE DANGER ZONE OF CONTESTABLE CIRCUMSTANCES ............... 983
THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR USING FREEDOM MOVEMENT
DEFENSE POLICY AS A MODEL FOR THINKING ABOUT
PRIVATE ARMS DURING CIVIL UNREST. ........................................ 987

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 989

Firearms and Protest: Lessons from the Black
Tradition of Arms
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON *
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1959, Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the
NAACP, articulated the mature self-defense policy of the organization and
the broader Freedom Movement.1 The icons of the Movement and legions
of unheralded heroes rejected political violence, but dedicated time, talent,
and treasure to upholding the rights of Black people who had used guns to
defend themselves and their families against imminent harm.2
Wilkins was in a running conflict with Monroe, North Carolina chapter
president Robert Williams, who had responded to one of a string of racist
affronts with rhetoric that many considered advocacy of political violence.3
Wilkins warned that Williams had violated the long-weathered principles
and policies of the organization.4 Martin Luther King, Jr. echoed Wilkins in
a widely circulated exchange of essays with Williams, where King endorsed
individual self-defense as entirely consistent with the Movement but
emphatically rejected the “incalculable perils” of political violence.5
The framers of this policy had firsthand experience in the space where
individuals must resist violence in kind or surrender to the fickle mercy of
mobs. As Movement leaders, their task might have been easier under a
practice of pure nonviolence. But, even with the Freedom Movement at
stake, they did not expect individuals to surrender the prerogative of armed
self-defense. 6 Indeed, they continuously deployed scarce resources to
uphold a bounded principle of armed self-defense against imminent threats.7
*
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984. Work in
firearms law includes Firearms Law and the Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights, and Policy (3d ed.
Aspen Publ’g 2021) and Negroes and the Gun: The Black Tradition of Arms (Prometheus Books 2014).
1
NICHOLAS JOHNSON, NEGROES AND THE GUN: THE BLACK TRADITION OF ARMS 29 (2014).
Starting as Assistant Secretary in 1931, Wilkins spent the rest of his working life at the NAACP. ROY
WILKINS & TOM MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS 113 (1982).
2
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 24.
3
Id. at 26.
4
TIMOTHY B. TYSON, RADIO FREE DIXIE: ROBERT F. WILLIAMS & THE ROOTS OF BLACK POWER
163 (1999).
5
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27.
6
Id. at 24–25.
7
The Freedom Movement was not monolithic, and the framing of this policy was looser than would
occur in a more rigid, formal structure. But, fundamentally, there was wide agreement that individuals
facing imminent threats must have the choice to resist violence in kind. Id. at 27–29.
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This constrained philosophy of arms advanced the Freedom Movement
through generations of social upheaval.8 Today, as we navigate the turmoil
of 2020 and beyond, the Freedom Movement offers enduring lessons about
the right to arms in the midst of protest and civil unrest. The experiences and
analyses that inform the Freedom Movement Defense Policy offer a body of
richly detailed precedents and guideposts for navigating the spectrum of
views about whether civil unrest should weaken or strengthen the case for
private arms in the modern context.
The self-defense policy that emerged from the Freedom Movement
compels our attention for many reasons. Its framers wrestled with and
balanced the dangers of the right to arms in a social and political tinderbox.9
The turmoil through which they navigated the tension between individual
self-defense and collective goals was more horrific and politically vexing
than anything we currently face. They confronted firsthand the policy
alternatives over a period of decades. They agonized over countless episodes
of defenseless victims hunted, harried, lynched, and burned, and weighed
those results against the alternative of armed resistance.
Out of these circumstances, they framed a policy of bounded resistance
that rests comfortably on the principles of the Reconstruction Constitution.10
This approach presents a right to arms that focuses on individual self-defense
and tables the troublesome, undertheorized issue of violent political
resistance imbedded in the right to arms of the eighteenth century.
This Essay presents the Freedom Movement Defense Policy as a model
for thinking about bearing private arms during periods of social unrest in the
twenty-first century. It proceeds in three Parts. Part I demonstrates that the
central framers of the policy were optimal agents with unmatched empathy
for the concerns of those who are most vulnerable during periods of civil
unrest. Part II shows how the policy they framed was honed through more
than half a century of turmoil to yield a time-tested guide for our modern
conversation. Part III presents the broad normative appeal of the policy as a
modern guidepost. It proceeds in four sections. Section A demonstrates the
serious and empathetic consideration of the imbedded alternatives of
submission or resistance. Section B illustrates the delineation of clear
boundaries surrounding forbidden political violence. Section C shows how
the policy recognizes and accommodates a contestable zone of highly
fact-dependent claims to legitimate self-defense. Section D shows that the
policy rests on sound practical constitutional and common law themes.

8

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part III.D.
9
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I. EMPATHETIC FRAMERS
As Roy Wilkins administered the mature self-defense policy of the
Black Freedom Movement through the tumultuous 1960s, he evoked the
moral authority of NAACP icons who were steeled in the crucible of the
1906 Atlanta Race Riot. Walter White (future NAACP Executive Secretary),
W.E.B. Du Bois (future Editor of the NAACP flagship magazine, The
Crisis) and Dr. Louis Wright (future NAACP Chairman) all survived the
terror, each of them clutching guns.11
These trailblazers were not detached policy makers debating what was
best for others. Status, education, and relative affluence did not shield them
from the risks faced by their constituents, and, consequently their agency on
firearms policy is unusually compelling. Their empathy for the self-defense
interests of victims of imminent violence was manifest. They faced mob
violence and chose the gun for protection against it. And they framed a
policy that respected the prerogative of others to make the same choice.
One source of knowledge about Dr. Louis Wright’s armed stand in
Atlanta is Roy Wilkins’s reverent account. “[H]e had been through the
Atlanta race riot of 1906, and . . . watched through the darkened windows of
his home, gun in hand.”12 Others confirm that Wright “was forced to defend
himself and his family when his stepfather put a Winchester rifle in his hand,
positioned him in the front of the house, and instructed [him] to shoot anyone
who came through the front gate.”13 One of the Wright’s white neighbors
helped them escape the gunfire and lynching threats.14
These accounts provide a basic appreciation of Wright’s experience. But
one is left craving details about Wright’s thoughts and fears, and how the
terror impacted him. Walter White, in contrast, provided a vivid firsthand
account of both the mobbing and its influence on him.15 Indeed, he presents
resistance against the mob as the central formative moment in his life.
Walter White looked white.16 He could have passed, as many did, onto
the vastly smoother path of life as a white man. In the first chapter of his
autobiography, titled I Learn What I Am, White writes candidly about the
consequences of embracing his African heritage and the plain option of
avoiding it.17 He describes the clear advantage of white skin,18 decades
before the term “white privilege” was coined, and how every year thousands
11

WILKINS & MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 90, 165.
Id. at 165. Dr. Louis T. Wright was the first Black chairman of the NAACP’s Board of Directors
and a graduate of Harvard Medical School. Id. at 165–66.
13
P. Preston Reynolds, Dr. Louis T. Wright and the NAACP: Pioneers in Hospital Racial
Integration, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 883, 884 (2000).
14
Id.
15
WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WALTER WHITE 3–12 (1948).
16
Id. at 3.
17
Id.
18
Id. (“There is magic in a white skin; there is tragedy, loneliness, exile, in a black skin.”).
12
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19

of light-skinned blacks succumbed to the appeal. White rejected the option
to pass for white, and the mob attack that cemented his Black identity
epitomized the policy of armed self-defense that the NAACP would press
for decades.20
The violence that left Walter White and his father, George, clutching
guns and preparing to fire on a looming mob boiled over from a fraught
Georgia gubernatorial campaign where the opponents were trying to “out
nigger” each other.21 Competition between the Atlanta newspapers added
fuel. The upstart Atlanta Journal trolled for readership with lurid, specious
reporting of Black men raping white women.22
On September 22, 1906, rumors of impending violence swirled.23 Walter
was assisting on his father’s mail route, driving the little horse-drawn
collection cart.24 Walter’s mother had urged her husband to leave Walter
home.25 But George was dismissive.26 He would soon regret it. Near the
middle of the route, they heard the “roar” of a mob.27 The target was a lame
bootblack who struggled on one good leg as the mob descended with “clubs
and fists.”28 Its bloody business done, the mob moved on, and “[t]he body
with the withered foot lay dead in a pool of blood on the street.”29
Light skin kept Walter and his father safe during this first brush with the
mob.30 After stomping the bootblack, the mob turned in pursuit of another
Black target who was sprinting in the other direction.31 A few blocks farther,
Walter nearly collided with a horse-drawn hearse carrying three fleeing
19

Id. (“Every year approximately twelve thousand white-skinned Negroes disappear—people
whose absence cannot be explained by death or emigration.”).
20
Discussing the moment that confirmed his identity, White explained:
I know the night when, in terror and bitterness of soul, I discovered that I was set apart
by the pigmentation of my skin (invisible though it was in my case) and the moment at
which I decided that I would infinitely rather be what I was than, through taking
advantage of the way of escape that was open to me, be one of the race which had
forced the decision upon me.
Id. at 4–5.
21
See, e.g., W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, From the Point of View of the Negroes, in 11 WORLD TO-DAY
1173, 1173–75 (1906) [hereinafter Du Bois, The Tragedy at Atlanta]; see generally REBECCA BURNS,
RAGE IN THE GATE CITY: THE STORY OF THE 1906 ATLANTA RACE RIOT 18–22 (rev. ed. 2009).
22
See, e.g., Du Bois, The Tragedy at Atlanta, supra note 21, at 1173.
23
WHITE, supra note 15, at 5; Dalton Windham, “The White Ribbon Army”: Politics and Race
Relations of the Georgia Woman’s Christian Temperance Union from 1880 to 1907, 24 J.S. LEGAL HIST.
151, 175 (2016).
24
WHITE, supra note 15, at 6, 9.
25
Id. at 6.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 9.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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Blacks. On the next turn they saw a familiar woman, the cook from a local
hotel, running for her life with the mob closing in.33 George reached down
and hauled the woman into the cart, and Walter lashed the horse to a gallop.34
The next morning, as Sunday church bells tolled, George yielded to his
wife and brought guns into the house.35 He had resisted, White reports,
“reluctant even in those circumstances to violate the law, but he at last gave
in at Mother’s insistence.”36
That night, Walter and his father crouched in the parlor, lights out, all
senses tuned for a fight.37 Around midnight they heard the mob.38 Then they
saw torches.39 One of the ring leaders, the son of their longtime grocer,
targeted the White’s home as “too nice for a nigger to live in,” and the mob
surged.40 Walter remembered distinctly his father’s words and icy tone: “Son,
don’t shoot until the first man puts his foot on the lawn and then—don’t
you miss!”41
As thirteen-year-old Walter wondered what it would feel like to kill a
man a volley of shots came from farther down the road.42 Some of George’s
friends had set up defenses in a neighboring building.43 Their first shots drew
the mob away from the White’s home,44 and the second volley scattered the
mob into retreat.45

32

Id.
Id. at 10.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. This statement about the illegality of acquiring a firearm is illuminated by Lugenia Burns Hope,
wife of the first Black president of Morehouse College, John Hope. She confirmed that “Negroes [were] not
able to buy fire arms for months before the Riot.” JACQUELINE ANNE ROUSE, LUGENIA BURNS HOPE:
BLACK SOUTHERN REFORMER 42 (1989). But as the violence spread, the Hopes and many others defied the
racist arms restrictions. See id. at 43 (“Sunday night John Hope patrolled the [Morehouse College] campus
. . . . [A] man[,] U.S. Army on furlough[,] came over and gave Mr. Hope a gun & cartridge belt. . . . Friends
had sent out of town for fire arms. . . . It was said they came in the city in coffins. However, we had the fire
arms and even though the city was under martial law, the Negroes succeeded in getting the fire arms to the
people who needed them. Some were carried in soiled laundry.”)
Du Bois recorded another version of the effort to disarm Blacks, which suggests both official efforts
and unofficial practice by retail sellers. As the prospect of violence escalated, “one hardware firm alone
sold $16,000 worth of arms to white people, while every effort was made to disarm Negroes.” Du Bois,
The Tragedy at Atlanta, supra note 21, at 1173.
37
WHITE, supra note 15, at 10–11.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 11.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 5, 12.
43
Id. at 12.
44
Id.
45
Id.
33
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Decades later, Walter White described this episode as a defining
moment of his life.46 It cemented his identity as a Black man.47 And it was
an object lesson about the prerogatives of free people whom the state cannot
or will not protect.48
Walter White would rise to do mighty work at the NAACP. He would
be instrumental in cases defending Black people who deployed guns against
racist violence—people like Walter and his family, for whom firearms
proved to be vital tools for survival in hostile environments.
The Atlanta Race Riot imprinted Walter White through the filter of
adolescence. 49 W.E.B. Du Bois, on the other hand, was thirty-eight years old
in 1906.50 His work building the NAACP magazine, The Crisis, into the
voice and conscience of Black America was still ahead.51 But he had already
earned a Harvard Ph.D. and a professorship at Atlanta University.52 His keen
intellect and view of the world were well formed.53
By 1906, Du Bois already had faced the fact that his academic tools were
inadequate to deal with the challenges of racism in the United States.54 The
pivotal lesson occurred just after he arrived in Atlanta.55 In the spring of
1899, a Black sharecropper named Sam Hose was gruesomely lynched.56 Du
Bois responded like a scholar. He was headed to the office of the Atlanta
Constitution to submit his critical essay when he learned that souvenirs of
the lynching—Sam Hose’s knuckles—were on display in a jar at a local
store.57 In that moment, Du Bois concluded that the staid tools of the
academic were inadequate to the task ahead. “Two considerations thereafter

46

Id. at 4–5.
Id.
48
Id. at 11.
49
Id. at 5.
50
Derrick P. Alridge, W.E.B. Du Bois in Georgia, NEW GA. ENCYCL., https://www.georgiaencyclop
edia.org/articles/history-archaeology/w-e-b-du-bois-georgia (July 21, 2020).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Du Bois attended Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee and graduated in 1888 with a B.A.
degree. Id. He enrolled at Harvard University in the fall of 1888, graduated cum laude with a second B.A.
degree in 1890, and earned an M.A. from Harvard a year later. Id. After his time at Harvard, Du Bois
studied at the University of Berlin in Germany. Id. When Du Bois returned to the United States in 1894,
he began teaching at Wilberforce University in Ohio and earned his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1896. His
dissertation was on the African slave trade. Id.
54
W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DU BOIS: A SOLILOQUY ON VIEWING MY LIFE
FROM THE LAST DECADE OF ITS FIRST CENTURY 212 (1968) [hereinafter DU BOIS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY].
55
Dominic J. Capeci Jr. & Jack C. Knight, Reckoning with Violence: W.E.B. Du Bois and the 1906
Atlanta Race Riot, 62 J.S. HIST. 727, 728, 731 (1996).
56
Id. at 731.
57
Id. at 732; DU BOIS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 54, at 212. After the mob stabbed, shot, and
burned Sam Hose, some waited around for the remains to cool in order to collect trophies. For an example
of the general phenomenon of trophy taking, see Harvey Young, The Black Body as Souvenir in American
Lynching, 57 THEATRE J. 639 (2005).
47
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broke in upon my work and eventually disrupted it,” he wrote. “[F]irst, one
could not be a calm, cool, and detached scientist while Negroes were
lynched, murdered and starved; and secondly, there was no such definite
demand for scientific work of the sort that I was doing.”59
Du Bois was in Alabama conducting a study of rural sharecroppers for
the Department of Labor when news of the rioting in Atlanta reached him.60
His reaction was swift. “I bought a Winchester barreled shotgun and two
dozen rounds of shells filled with buckshot. If a white mob had stepped on
the campus where I lived I would without hesitation have sprayed their guts
over the grass.”61
There is no evidence that Du Bois pointed his gun at mobbers. But the
lessons that impacted his subsequent advocacy at the NAACP are evident in
his widely disseminated essay, “The Tragedy at Atlanta: From the Point of
View of the Negroes.”62 Du Bois’ first substantive point criticized the local
policy and practice to arm whites and disarm Blacks.63 The core lesson about
self-defense was plain: “In the last resort[,] democratic governments have to
depend on the self-defense of law-abiding citizens against the lawless.”64
Then, noting the practical and vital utility of arms, Du Bois explained, “As
soon as the dazed Negroes realized the situation they naturally began to arm
and fight. . . . Again and again[,] the whites started toward ‘Darktown’ one
of the slums, but hesitated.”65
58

DU BOIS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 54, at 222
Id.
60
DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 1868-1919 354 (1993).
61
DU BOIS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 54, at 286. Du Bois wrote:
59

I revered life. . . . Nearly all my schoolmates in the South carried pistols. I never
owned one. I could never conceive myself killing a human being. But in 1906 I rushed
back from Alabama to Atlanta where my wife and six-year old child were living. A
mob had raged for days killing Negroes. I bought a Winchester double-barreled
shotgun and two dozen rounds of shells filled with buckshot. If a white mob had
stepped on the campus where I lived I would without hesitation have sprayed their
guts over the grass. They did not come. They went to south Atlanta where the police
let them steal and kill. My gun was fired but once and then by error into a row of
Congressional Records, which lined the lower shelf of my library.
Id.; see also Capeci & Knight, supra note 55, at 732 (noting that Du Bois was instinctively “[a] pacifist
who as a child had recoiled even at the thought of hunting for food”).
62
Du Bois, The Tragedy at Atlanta, supra note 21, at 1174–75.
63
Du Bois’ description of the cause of the riots reads like modern headlines, with complaints and
supportive statistics suggesting that Atlanta police targeted Blacks as fodder for the Georgia system that
profited from incarceration. Id. at 1174. This disarmament attempt is also confirmed by Lugenia Burns
Hope. See ROUSE, supra note 36, at 42–43.
64
Du Bois, The Tragedy at Atlanta, supra note 21, at 1174.
65
Id. Just holding onto their guns was a challenge for Blacks in Atlanta. After the worst of the violence
had subsided, the mayor, worried about Black retaliation, attempted to disarm Blacks. ROUSE, supra note
36, at 43. The success of this effort is contested. Some accounts stated simply that Blacks were disarmed by
militiamen. See Capeci & Knight, supra note 55, at 741. But Lugenia Burns Hope recounted how “[t]he
Mayor gave [an] order to have Negro homes searched for fire arms. The Negroes hid their arms and also
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Du Bois scholars point to the Sam Hose lynching as the beginning of his
turn toward a more radical strategy of agitation and protest.66 But the Atlanta
Race Riot was the first indication that Du Bois was willing to fight with
arms. His willingness to carve out a proper space for armed resistance grew
into an unyielding support for the individual prerogative of armed
self-defense. The NAACP was not yet formed, but its most eloquent future
spokesman was already steeled for the battles ahead.67
Roy Wilkins’s experience with mob violence was less dramatic, but the
theme of resistance against racism and the looming threat of mobbing ran
deep in his consciousness. The first two chapters of his autobiography are
set at the turn of the twentieth century, when Wilkins’s parents fled
Mississippi ahead of a brewing mob. Roy’s father, Willie, had pummeled a
white man who ran up on him in a wagon and shouted, “Nigger, get out of
my way.”68 Word spread like wildfire. A white friend warned Wilkins’s
grandfather, “[Y]ou better get that boy Willie out of town. . . . He’s heading
for a lynching for sure.”69 In the cover of darkness, Grandfather Wilkins
snuck Willie and his wife out of town, and eventually got them on a train
north.70 Wilkins summarized it this way: “The Lord may have delivered
Daniel from the lion’s den and Grandfather Wilkins from slavery, but it was
the Illinois Central that delivered my father from Mississippi—one step
ahead of a lynch rope.”71
Wilkins’s more direct experience with mob violence, where he “lost
[his] innocence,” was the 1920 Duluth, Minnesota lynching.72 He was
working as a dining car waiter on the Northern Pacific Railroad during the

those of their neighbors who were not at home. When this order came thru [sic]—the Negroes telephoned
the Governor, ‘take our arms and we will fire the city.’ That stopped the house to house inspection.” ROUSE,
supra note 36, at 43.
66
See Capeci & Knight, supra note 55, at 728 (“Du Bois had approached the South naively . . . .
Twenty-nine years old, he arrived at Atlanta University in 1897 convinced that superior intelligence,
scientific investigation, and collegial effort would solve the race problem.”).
67
Id. One impulse for formation of the NAACP was another bout of rioting in 1908 in Springfield,
Illinois. Berry Craig, William English Walling: Kentucky’s Unknown Civil Rights Hero, 96 REG. KY.
HIST. SOC’Y 351, 358, 361 (1998); see also William English Walling, The Race War in the North, INDEP.,
Sept. 3, 1908, at 529.
68
WILKINS & MATHEWS, supra note 1, at 16.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 46. There were plenty of petty affronts, as well. In St. Louis, racists confronted Wilkins for
offering his streetcar seat to a white woman. Id. at 65. Wilkins had a walking while Black episode in
Kansas City, where police officers mistook his wife for white in the glare of headlights. They stopped,
jumped out, and frisked him. He filed a complaint, and the police officers admitted that they thought they
were rousting an interracial couple. Id. at 104. Wilkins recounts an incident where an elderly white
woman refused the seat that he surrendered on a streetcar, noting that she would not “accept a seat from
a nigger.” Id. at 65. He describes an effort by a group of citizens to condemn Black homes to create a
border between Black and white neighborhoods. Id. at 68.
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summer while attending the University of Minnesota. He was “just shy of
nineteen.”74 Toward the end of his life, Wilkins would “still feel a shock
every time [he] [thought] back on what happened that summer.”75
The lynch mob started to simmer after Black carnival workers were
accused of assaulting a white girl.76 Following several arrests, a mob broke
through a wall at the jail, dragged three of the accused from their cells and
hanged them.77 One of these was a gruesome double assault where the rope
broke, the victim fell to the ground, was beaten, stomped, and then strung
up again.78
Mobbing like the violence in Duluth gave Wilkins a strong basic
empathy for the impulse toward political violence. Early on, he entertained
a hot-blooded plan to retaliate against brutal lynchings by organizing a band
of vigilantes. “What I had in mind was a black Robin Hood band that would
pounce in punish with no warning.”79 His cooler instincts ultimately
prevailed and later he juxtaposed the murderous fantasy with a core tenet of
the Freedom Movement doctrine:
We could not have made the fantasy work. We would have
invited our own deaths instead. In this country, black people
are a permanent minority[,] and we will never have the
numbers or the guns to stage a successful armed revolution.
This is a hard reality, and it makes revolutionary cults little
better than suicide cults.80
In time, Wilkins, Du Bois, and White would pull heavy oars at the
burgeoning NAACP.81 They would sharpen policies that reflected the
practice and philosophy of arms applied by generations.82 They would direct
resources to protect individuals who used guns to defend themselves against
mobs, where government was unable or unwilling to protect them.83 Their
manifest empathy for people backed to the wall by violent threats made them
powerful stewards of the Freedom Movement Defense Policy.

73

Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 49.
75
Id. at 46–47.
76
Id. at 47.
77
Id. at 48–49.
78
Id. at 48.
79
Id. at 77.
80
Id. In 1923, after the KKK held a rally just north of his home in St. Paul, Wilkins ruminated on
“[how] to fight back[.]” The answer would come in August of that year at the NAACP’s Midwestern
Race Relations Conference, where he first encountered Walter White, James Weldon Johnson, and
W.E.B. Du Bois. Id. at 58.
81
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 171.
82
Id. at 291.
83
Id. at 172–73.
74
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II. A TIME-TESTED MODEL
Roy Wilkins’s position in the Robert Williams affair rested firmly on an
approach honed over decades. It started with the very first litigation that the
NAACP supported.84 The First Annual Report of the organization is full of
descriptions of “legal redress” work in support of Black armed self-defense
claims.85 The first case was the defense of South Carolina sharecropper Pink
Franklin.86 The seed of the violence was Franklin’s violation of a so-called
“agricultural contract.”87 Unlike every other contract, where the remedy for
breach was a civil action for money damages, these “contracts” were
administered under the South Carolina Criminal Code.88 Sharecroppers who
breached could be jailed.89 Franklin did, in fact, breach his contract, and, in
the dark of early morning, lawmen descended to arrest him.90 Franklin
claimed that he was startled awake by armed strangers in his bedroom.91
After one of them shot him, Franklin grabbed his rifle and fired back.92 The
lawmen claimed the doors to the house and bedroom were open, and they
were attacked after knocking and entering.93 The NAACP report records that
constable “H.H. Valentine . . . broke into Franklin’s cabin at three o’clock
in the morning, with drawn pistol, without announcing that he was an officer
of the law, and Franklin shot him in defense of his home.94 Governor Ansel
commuted Franklin’s sentence to life imprisonment, but the Association will
not cease its efforts to free Franklin from prison.”95
The promise of ceaseless efforts on behalf of Franklin was no hyperbole.
Due substantially to the NAACP’s persistence and lobbying by Booker T.
Washington, Pink Franklin was ultimately pardoned and released.96
NAACP’s next case was the defense of another sharecropper, Steve
Greene.97 Greene walked away from a peonage contract after his landlord
and employer doubled his rent. 98 The landlord tracked Greene down at his
new job and shot him but did not kill him.99 Greene retrieved his rifle, killed
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the landlord, then fled to Chicago. NAACP and Ida B. Wells aided
Greene in contesting extradition. 101 With the proceedings pending, Greene
fled to Canada. 102
Freedom Movement Defense Policy also evolved and was reflected in
the work and decision-making of the NAACP branches. For example, the
1914 Annual Report trumpets the success of the Baltimore branch in
securing the exoneration of George Howe.103 Howe was arrested for firing
into a crowd that was stoning his residence wounding four, who were not
seriously hurt.104 The NAACP secured Howe’s release and appealed the
Police Justice’s sentence.105 By the time the Fifth Annual Report was
published, “George Howe of Baltimore had been acquitted in the shooting
of members of a mob that were attacking his home in Baltimore.”106
NAACP supported many cases over the years. None were more
consequential to the framing and advancement of Movement policy than the
defense of Dr. Ossian Sweet and his family, who used guns against a mob
that aimed to run them out of their new home in a white neighborhood in
Detroit.107 By the time of the Sweets’ armed stand in the summer of 1925,
the mobbing of Blacks who attempted to integrate white neighborhoods had
drawn the ire and focus of the NAACP national office.108 In the months
preceding the mobbing of Ossian Sweet, several other Black families had
defended their homes against mobs.109 From the national office, Executive
Secretary James Weldon Johnson already had penned angry editorials
condemning mobs that had “driven Negroes from their homes and defending
those who defended themselves in absence of adequate police protection.”110
One such family was Aldeine and Fleta Mathies, newly arrived in
Detroit from Georgia. 111 They rented a house with another couple on
the border between the Black section, “Black Bottom,” and an ethnic
white neighborhood.112
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Neighborhood racists sent threatening letters and then came in person to
tell the Mathies they were not welcome.113 When the Mathies dug in, the
mob descended.114 For two nights, the men of the house rebuffed the mob
by making a show of standing guard with rifles.115 Later in the week, while
the men were away at work, the mob returned.116 When they started stoning
the house, Fleta Mathies fired out of one of the broken windows.117 The
gunfire dispersed the crowd, but the police subsequently arrested her on gun
charges.118 Fleta Mathies was exonerated after W.H. McKinney, the past
president of the Detroit NAACP, showed that she feared for her life and fired
in self-defense.119 Mathies returned home, and, though causation is unclear,
the mobbing stopped.
In July, mobbers beset the Stoepel Avenue home of John Fletcher after
a white woman from across the street went door to door to gin up support
for chasing out the Blacks.120 As a crowd formed, Fletcher called the
police.121 But when the cops arrived, they just talked amiably with people on
the sidewalk.122 Around eight o’clock, the mood shifted. Fletcher’s neighbor
had just gotten a delivery of coal and some in the crowd started to hurl
chunks of it at Fletcher’s home.123 The pelting accelerated and soon they
broke out every window in the house.124 Later, Fletcher explained to a judge
how he tripped over chunks of coal as he ran to a second-floor bedroom, rifle
in hand where, through a broken-out window, he fired into the mob, hitting
a teenage boy.125 Fletcher convinced the judge that he feared for his life and
fired only after all the windows in his home were broken out and someone
in the mob yelled “lynch him.”126
When Ossian Sweet moved his family into the house on Garland
Avenue, it was plain that mobs would not be swayed by class distinctions.
Yes, Fleta Mathies was a new migrant from Georgia, and George Fletcher
was a waiter. But Sweet’s colleague Dr. Albert Turner also was sent running
by a mob that looted and trashed his new residence on the border of a white
113
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neighborhood. Ossian Sweet was fully aware of this when he carried two
canvas sacks containing twelve guns and four hundred rounds of
ammunition into his new home.127
The first night, news of the Sweets’ arrival drew a crowd of a few
hundred people. Three other men, Ossian’s two brothers and a handy man,
were in the house. Ossian took the men upstairs, showed them the guns, and
worked out a schedule for standing watch. Around midnight, a hail of rocks
hit the house, and then there was silence.
The first night turned out to just be a warm up. The second night, a far
larger crowd appeared. The rumor mill said that this time they had a plan for
driving the Sweets out. When Ossian’s brother Otis arrived in a cab, the
crowd stoned him and hurled racial epithets.128 The men in the house ran
upstairs and retrieved guns.129 Mobbers pummeled the house with stones and
debris.130 Then there were gun shots.131 One white man in the mob fell dead,
another was wounded.132
The initial prosecution swept up the entire Sweet family.133 NAACP
hired legendary trial lawyer Clarence Darrow to defend them.134 Walter
White was diligently on the scene as the trial progressed.135 His November
1925 letter to James Weldon Johnson demonstrates the ballooning
significance of the Sweet case to the organization and the intensity of
White’s attention to the potential that a successful outcome represented.136
127
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Ultimately, the exoneration of the Sweets fueled fundraising so successful
that it left a surplus sufficient to implement James Weldon Johnson’s dream
of a standing fund that could support important litigation on a consistent
basis.137 We know this today as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.138
Litigation was only one way of pressing the Movement’s self-defense
policy.139 Equally important were the powerful articulations of policy in the
flagship magazine, The Crisis. By one account, the name of the
magazine was a direct reaction to the 1908 racist mobbing and lynching in
Springfield, Illinois.140
As editor, W.E.B. Du Bois guided The Crisis to become the voice and
conscience of Black America. In the process, he articulated the vital role of
armed self-defense in the context of some of the worst civil unrest in
American history. His editorial following the 1919 Chicago Race Riot is a
prime example of the philosophy and practice that the NAACP would
advance for decades to come:
Today we raise the terrible weapon of Self-Defense. When the
murderer comes, he shall no longer strike us in the back . . . .
When the armed lynchers gather, we too must gather armed.
When the mob moves, we propose to meet it with bricks and
clubs and guns. But we must tread here with solemn caution.
We must never let justifiable self-defense against individuals
become blind and lawless offense against all white folk. We
must not seek reform by violence. We must not seek
Vengeance. . . . We must defend ourselves, our homes, our
wives and children against the lawless without stint or
hesitation; but we must carefully and scrupulously avoid on
our own part bitter and unjustifiable aggression against
anybody.141
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Here, Du Bois frames a policy of action that flatly rejects lawless
violence and adopts the boundaries embedded in ancient principles of
self-defense against imminent threats to life and limb.142 He layers this with
the caution against treading into the forbidden territory of political
violence—i.e., aggressive violence as a way of seeking political reform.143
Over time, Du Bois advanced the message of righteous self-defense,
carefully constrained to avoid political violence in multiple contexts. Indeed,
as discussed in Part III, in some cases he went further, characterizing
self-defense as a moral imperative.144
There is a temptation to consider the framing of the Freedom Movement
Defense Policy as an exclusively male phenomenon. But, policy leaders like
Daisy Bates, President of Arkansas Conference of NAACP Branches,
demonstrate the opposite. Bates famously guided the Little Rock Nine
through the minefield of integrating Little Rock High School.145 She was, in
the words of Roy Wilkins, the target of “a real terror campaign.”146 She had
first hand confrontations with mobs, and fired guns in self-defense against
racist terrorists.147 Bates was ultimately aligned with Roy Wilkins in the
Robert Williams Affair.148 But, even then, the editorial stance of her
newspaper, The Arkansas State Press, emphatically supported the individual
prerogative of armed self-defense. 149
Daisy Bates was no anomaly. Many other Black women advanced the
Movement defense policy and personally wielded guns to defend themselves
and their families. Legendary voting rights activist Fannie Lou Hamer
demonstrates this in her commentary about the essential tools of survival in
an environment where every night might bring terror. Hamer navigated the
risks of activism through the storms of the 1960s, pressing the struggle as a
leader in the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and founding the
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150

National Women’s Political Caucus. Hamer’s tactical stance was rooted
partly in scripture. Speaking about the racists who terrorized her, Hamer was
forgiving.151 But long experience left her unwilling to leave the other cheek
exposed. Asked how she endured the multiple hazards of the time, Hamer
responded, “I’ll tell you why. I keep a shotgun in every corner of my
bedroom and the first cracker even look like he wants to throw some
dynamite on my porch won’t write his mama again.”152 Fannie Lou Hamer
and Daisy Bates became civil rights legends, but most of the women whose
experience fueled the Freedom Movement Defense Policy are consigned to
footnotes in the broader narrative.
Annie Colton Reeves of Pike County, Mississippi, described how her
family saved and sacrificed to buy a heavy-caliber Winchester rifle to
supplement the family’s four other guns. Annie’s father advised, “[It’s]
better to have ammunition than to have food.”153 The deterrent value was
evident when Annie raised a gun to repel a group of menacing young men,
warning them, “Whenever you get ready to go to hell you come back.”154
In 1962, Rebecca Wilson of Dallas, Georgia, returned fire when hooded
Klansmen blasted her door with a shotgun.155 “It was the idea of the masks,”
Wilson explained.156 “I was scared. I didn’t know what I was shooting at. I
just had my hand out the door.”157 Wilson killed one man, wounded
another,158 and the others fled.159 The shooting was ultimately classified as
lawful self-defense. 160 Several of the Klansmen were charged with violating
the state’s anti-masking law.161 Wilson was placed in protective custody and
moved out of state.162
In Carroll County, Mississippi, activist Leola Blackmon deployed her
sixteen-shot semiautomatic rifle to repel Klansmen who burned a cross in

150
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her yard. “I thought to cut ’em down,” she recalled later, “but I didn’t. I
just let some bullets through behind ’em. I had a rifle. It would shoot sixteen
times, and I just lit out up there and started shooting.”164 Leola Blackmon
was unschooled, but fully captured the principles of the Freedom Movement
Defense Policy. “Well, we said nonviolent when we was protesting the
school buses; nobody not s’posed to fight. But that fight was brought on
because we were looking for them to hit us.”165
In Jonesboro, Louisiana, Klansmen stood in the open, admiring their
work after lighting a cross in the yard of Reverend Y. D. Jackson.166 Soon
they were ducking and running under gunfire from Reverend Jackson’s wife,
who emptied her rifle at them and was quickly reloading.167 During the
Freedom Summer Project, a student volunteer was shocked to find that her
host, “Mrs. Fairley, was armed to the teeth.”168 In a letter home, the student
wrote, “I met Mrs. Fairley coming down the hall from the front porch
carrying a rifle in one hand [and] a pistol in the other.”169
Naturally, women in the Movement did not always act in isolation.
Various accounts show Black couples doing what was necessary to fend off
violent threats, unencumbered by any notion that it was man’s work.170
Northern activist Margaret Rose provides a snapshot of this. After a series
of midnight attacks in neighboring counties, Rose recorded that the family
she stayed with in Holmes County, Mississippi “were up all . . . night, Mr.
on the road patrolling with his new rifle and Mrs. walking from room to
room in the house with a shot gun.”171
In Meridian, Mississippi, a defense group drawn from church members
guarded the home of NAACP leader Claude Bryant.172 In April 1964, after
an explosion rocked his house, Bryant laid down rifle fire on a car full of
firebombers.173 Three months later, bombers attacked the home of his
brother, Charlie.174 With the front windows blown from the house, Charlie’s
163
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wife, Ora, emerged out of the smoke with a shotgun and fired on the fleeing
terrorists.175 The Bryants were not the only family on guard that night. One
neighbor described the scene:
That car was fired on so many times coming out of there . . . by
people straight up the street all through there . . . [a]nd he was
shot at when he turned the curb, coming back towards town . . .
[a]nd you could hear people hollering “here he come.”176
Afterward, the rumor spread that the wounded terrorists were taken out of
state for treatment in order to suppress the story of Black triumph.177
The Bryants and their neighbors understood that the fight was not over
and followed up by organizing regular armed watches.178 Annie Reeves,
whose husband also helped guard Claude Bryant, recounted sitting in her
living room with the lights out, a rifle clutched in her lap.179 Mr. and Mrs.
Matthew Nobles, active members in Claude Bryant’s NAACP branch, made
their own preparations and guarded their neighbors.180 During the worst of
it, chapter member Matthew Nobles camped on the roof of his house with a
rifle while his wife slept fitfully, listening for trouble through an open
window, her own rifle at the ready.181
In Forrest County, Mississippi, NAACP leader Vernon Dahmer had
pressed the NAACP agenda since the early 1950s when he sued the county
sheriff for interfering with Black voting efforts.182 When northern students
came to help with voter registration, some of them stayed with Dahmer and
wrote home about the “guns, pistols and rifles . . . placed throughout his
house.”183 When tensions escalated through the early 1960s, Dahmer and his
bride, Ellie, alternated sleeping and sitting up with guns.184 They continued
this practice through 1965.185
In Jonesboro, Louisiana, Bob and Jackie Hicks were an effective team
in thwarting a series of threats against them and northern activists they
hosted.186 When a group of student volunteers from the University of Kansas
was attacked and fled back to the Hick’s house, the attackers retreated when
Jackie Hicks stepped out onto the porch with a pistol in her hand.187 Later
175
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that night, a car rolled up and a white man jumped out and hurled something
through the windshield of a vehicle owned by one of the students.188 Bob
Hicks ran outside with his gun to investigate.189 The terrorists fired a shot
from their car.190 Hicks fired back.191 Then, from cover around Hicks’s
house, members of the Deacons for Defense opened fire and the terrorists
sped out of sight.192 Everyone in and around the Hicks’ home came through
the shootout unscathed.193 But Black hospital workers reported that two
Klansmen were shot, and the story was suppressed in order to conceal police
complicity in the attack.194
Decades of practical application show that Freedom Movement Defense
Policy is a durable model that warrants consideration as a guidepost for our
modern discussion of arms-bearing during periods of civil unrest. Toward
the end of his life, Roy Wilkins distilled the decades of practice and
messaging to its essence:
Like [Robert] Williams, I believe in self-defense. While I
admire Reverend King’s theories of overwhelming enemies
with love, I don’t think I could have put those theories into
practice myself. But there is a difference between self-defense
and murder, and I had no intention of getting the N.A.A.C.P.
into the lynching business. So I made our principle stick.195
III. THE APPEAL OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT DEFENSE POLICY AS A
GUIDEPOST FOR THE MODERN CONVERSATION ABOUT THE
ROLE OF PRIVATE ARMS DURING CIVIL UNREST
This Part presents the Freedom Movement Defense Policy as a model for
thinking about the role of private arms during modern civil unrest in four
sections. Section A demonstrates the framers’ serious and empathetic
consideration of the imbedded alternatives of submission or resistance.
Section B illustrates the delineation of boundaries surrounding forbidden
political violence. Section C shows the pragmatic recognition of a contestable
zone of highly fact-dependent claims to legitimate use of force. Section D
presents the policy as a pragmatic balance of individual and community
interests that rests on familiar constitutional and common law themes.
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A. Submission or Resistance
A compelling aspect of the Freedom Movement Defense Policy as a
guidepost for our twenty-first century conversation is that it incorporates
serious and empathetic assessment of the imbedded alternatives of resistance
or submission. The alternative to resistance appears graphicly in endless,
gory accounts of hapless victims set upon by mobs. Walter White’s book,
Rope and Faggot: A Biography of Judge Lynch, epitomizes the theme.196 It
is a systematic study of “mob murders.” The work includes detailed
descriptions of mobbing that White reported after going to lynching venues
and passing for white.197
Rope and Faggot offers a representative catalogue of the worst-case
consequences of submission to mobs.198 Many of the instances are too
gruesome to bear repeating. It is enough to say that mobs deployed every
imaginable torture. Perhaps aware that a vivid presentation of the gore at the
start might cause readers to drop the book and flee, White’s first lines capture
the terror subtly and perhaps more powerfully than all of the gruesome
details that follow. The setting is a town in Florida where:
[S]ome years ago several lynchings . . . followed the attempt
of a Negro pharmacist to vote in a national election. One
morning shortly afterwards I walked along the road which led
from the beautiful little town to the spot where five Negroes
had been burned. Three shining-eyed, healthy, cleanly
children, headed for school, approached me. As I neared
them, the eldest . . . asked if I was going to the place where
“the niggers” had been killed. I told her I might stop and see
the spot. Animatedly, almost as joyously as though the
memory were of Christmas morning or the circus, she told
me, her slightly younger companions interjecting a word here
and there . . . of “the fun we had burning the niggers.”199
The NAACP would record and resist decades of this sort of terror. With
every new attack, the New York office displayed a well-worn flag from the
window of its location overlooking Fifth Avenue with the message: “Negro
Lynched Today.”200 The organization’s magazine The Crisis, contained a
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regular section devoted to “Lynching,” along with other recurring topics like
“Legislation” and “Education.”201 The considered policy of NAACP and the
broader Freedom Movement endorsed the prerogative of individuals facing
mobs to resist—and to resist with arms—even while acknowledging that this
resistance might fail.202
Mobbers competed on a scale of gore, but the power dynamic was
consistent. Defenseless victims were entirely at the mercy of the mob, and
the crowds reveled in the spectacle and slaughter. Compared to the
alternative of helpless submission, the hazards and uncertainty of resistance
have multilayered appeal. The first and most obvious is expressed in Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s intervention in the Robert Williams affair. Drawing a
contrast to forbidden political violence, King explained:
Violence exercised merely in self-defense, all societies, from
the most primitive to the most cultured and civilized, accept as
moral and legal. The principle of self-defense, even involving
weapons and bloodshed, has never been condemned, even by
Gandhi. . . . When the Negro uses force in self-defense, he does
not forfeit support—he may even win it, by the courage and
self-respect it reflects.203
King’s distillation, particularly his reference to the courage and
self-respect that self-defense reflects, captures the normative philosophical
appeal of resistance versus submission. Other critiques demonstrate more
utilitarian reasons to prefer resistance over submission.
Several framers pressed the view that resistance was not just an
important moral and legal prerogative, but also a practical deterrent against
mob terror. Following the 1919 race riot in Washington, D.C., NAACP
Executive Secretary, James Weldon Johnson, conducted an in-depth, on the
scene investigation and provided a pointed critique of how peace was
restored. He concluded that, “The Negroes saved themselves and saved
Washington by their determination not to run but to fight, fight in defense
their lives and their homes. If the white mob had gone unchecked—and it
was only the determined effort of black men that checked it—Washington
would have been another and worse East St. Louis.”204
QUARTZ (July 9, 2016), https://qz.com/727602/the-naacps-a-man-was-lynched-yesterday-flag-has-beenreprised-and-hangs-in-new-york-city.
201
See generally Annual Report, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 19
CRISIS 240, 247 (1920). See also NAACP, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE FOR THE YEARS 1917 AND 1918 25-43 (1919) [hereinafter
NAACP 1917–1918 REPORT] (combining the Eighth Annual Report of 1917 and the Ninth Annual
Report of 1918). The Ninth Annual Report of 1918 includes several parts, including Part II on “The Fight
Against Lynching” and Part III on “Welfare and Defense of Colored Soldier.” Id.
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W.E.B. Du Bois presented resistance as a practical deterrent and also
pressed it as a moral imperative. Du Bois publicly excoriated Blacks who
failed to resist mobs. One of his most biting critiques was leveled at the
Black community in Gainesville, Florida, who passively observed the attack
known today as the Newberry Lynching.205 Du Bois’ searing criticism
appeared under the heading “Cowardice” in the editorial section at the
beginning of the magazine.206
No colored man can read an account of the recent lynching at
Gainesville, Fla., without being ashamed of his people. The
action was characteristic. White officers, knowing themselves
in the wrong and afraid of the resistance of colored men,
sneaked in at midnight to serve a warrant on a person who they
hoped would be helpless and ignorant of their intentions. Two
of them seized the man in his house and after the melee one of
the white men was dead and the other seriously wounded. Of
the right and wrong of this no one will ever really be sure. There
is no proof that the black man was guilty; there is no proof that
he knowingly resisted arrest. There is proof on the other hand,
that after this extraordinary attack his colored fellows acted like
a set of cowardly sheep. Without resistance they let a white mob
whom they outnumbered two to one, torture, harry and murder
their women, shoot down innocent men entirely unconnected
with the alleged crime, and finally to cap the climax, they caught
and surrendered the wretched man whose attempted arrest
caused the difficulty. . . .
No people who behave with the absolute cowardice shown by
these colored people can hope to have the sympathy or help of
the civilized folk. The men and women who had nothing to do
with the alleged crime should have fought in self-defense to the
last ditch if they had killed every white man in the county and
themselves been killed. The man who surrendered to a lynching
mob the victim of the sheriff ought himself to have been locked
up. In the last analysis lynching of Negroes is going to stop in
the South when the cowardly mob is faced by effective guns in
the hands of people determined to sell their souls dearly.207
205
See, e.g., Brianda Villegas, City of Newberry Opens Up About the “Newberry Six,” WCJB (Sept.
21, 2018, 12:09 AM), https://www.wcjb.com/content/news/City-of-Newberry6-493918581.html;
Rebecca Santana, ‘This Is What We Know’: Newberry Begins Reckoning Over Lynching History, WUFT
(Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.wuft.org/news/2018/09/21/this-is-what-we-know-newberry-beginsreckoning-over-lynching-history/.
206
Cowardice, 12 CRISIS 270, 270–71 (1916).
207
Id. (emphasis added). Du Bois struck the same chord in 1919 following the Chicago Race Riot,
urging Blacks to pick up guns against the mob, though simultaneously cautioning against political
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Careful observers in the white press also took note of the deterrence theme,
and The Crisis reported it. Following the 1921 Tulsa Race Riot, The Crisis
roared, “Out of the welter of fire and blood, in which Tulsa lies submerged, one
fact arises stark and challenging. Regardless of the odds and heavily
outnumbered, the Negroes united to save one of their own. An armed mob met
armed resistance.”208 Then, quoting a recent article in the New Republic, The
Crisis editorial shows that the white press had noticed: “T]he emergence of a
spirit of forcible resistance on the part of the Negroes. ‘Get a gun’ is the advice
of scores of Negro leaders. ‘Hit back; make them respect you.’”209
T. Thomas Fortune, fiery editor of the New York Age (one of the leading
Black newspapers of its time),210 pressed the theme of self-defense as a
deterrent with equal fervor. Describing the agenda of the nascent
Afro-American League, Fortune explained:
[W]e propose to accomplish our purposes by the peaceful
methods and agitation through the ballot and the courts. But if
others use the weapons of violence to combat our peaceful
arguments, it is not for us to run away from violence. Attucks,
the black patriot – he was no coward.. . . “And if there comes
violence, let those who oppose our just cause throw the first
stone”. . . . [T]o be murdered by mobs is not to be endured
without protest. . . .211
Commenting on a conflict in Virginia, Fortune wrote, “If white men are
determined upon shooting whenever they have a difference with a colored
man, let the colored man be prepared to shoot also.”212 While his rhetoric
was sometimes inflammatory, Fortune was careful to caution, “We do not
counsel violence; we counsel manly retaliation . . . in the absence of law . . .
we maintain that the individual has every right in law and equity to use every
means in his power to protect himself.”213 Responding to criticism of his
editorial stance from the white press, Fortune published a pointed response
that elaborates the theme of resistance as a deterrent:
We have no disposition to fan the coals of race discord. But
when colored men are assailed . . . they have a perfect right to
“stand their ground[]” . . . . If they run away like cowards they
violence. Du Bois, Let Us Reason Together, supra note 141, at 231; Alison Martin, This Week in History:
Violence Escalates in 1919 Chicago Race Riots, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 29, 2021, 11:30 AM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2021/7/29/22596538/1919-chicago-race-riots-south-side-red-summer.
208
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209
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210
T. Thomas Fortune, T. THOMAS FORTUNE CULTURAL CTR., https://www.tthomasfortunecultur
alcenter.org/the-house (last visited Feb. 22, 2022).
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212
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will be regarded as “inferior” and worthy to be shot; but if they
“stand their ground” manfully, and do their honest share of the
shooting they will be respected, and by so doing they will
lessen the propensity of white roughs to incite riot.214
Mirroring Fortune, many statements of Freedom Movement Defense
Policy are steeped in the gendered rhetoric of Black manhood. In a 1912
editorial, Du Bois, manifestly furious about recent lynchings of Black men
who had resisted sexual assaults by whites on wives, daughters, and
sweethearts, thundered, “Let black men especially kill lecherous white
invaders of their homes and then take their lynching gladly like men. It’s
worth it!”215 But, as detailed in Part II, armed resistance by Black women
disproves the stereotype.216
Ida B. Wells famously advanced the deterrence theme in her advice that
the Winchester Rifle deserves a place of honor in every Black home. Wells
was specifically referencing two recent episodes where armed Blacks
successfully averted lynchings.217 Those episodes epitomize the gold
standard of resistance, where righteous defensive violence saves the lives of
mob victims. Those sorts of cases present a powerful reason to prefer
resistance over submission.218 Measured against the option of succumbing
immediately to violent attack, the case remains compelling even where the
aftermath demands working through the public security bureaucracy. The
Sweets, Pink Franklin, Steve Green, and countless others were manifestly
better off resisting.219
Another layer of this theme surrounds cases of failed resistance where
the responsive commentary still advances a cultural norm of resistance
toward the goal of deterrence. Several examples demonstrate the theme. The
NAACP’s years-long defense of U.S. Army Sergeant Edgar Caldwell is a
textured example of the effort to establish resistance as a cultural norm.220
Following a dispute about seating, two trolly workers threw Caldwell off
into the street, and then proceeded to stomp him.221 Caldwell shot both of
them, killing one.222 “Newspaper accounts . . . so aroused the race prejudice
214

Id. at 49; JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 120, 122 (“[N]onresistance invited contempt and massacre
of the race”).
215
Divine Right, 3 CRISIS 197, 197 (1912).
216
See supra Part II.
217
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 111–12.
218
See, e.g., id. at 131 (recounting armed Black men rescuing Edwin McCabe in Oklahoma); id. at
160 (rescuing George Dinning of Kentucky); id. at 185 (rescuing Anthony Williams); id. at 245 (rescuing
Hartman Turnbow); id. at 246 (rescuing Robert Cooper); id. at 249 (rescuing Winson Hudson); id. at 277
(rescuing Robert Hicks).
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 19 CRISIS 129, 131 (1920).
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Id. at 130–31.
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of the white people of the county that they were talking of lynching him.”223
The NAACP pressed Caldwell’s defense through the state courts to the United
States Supreme Court and appealed to the governor for clemency.224
In March 1920, W.E.B. Du Bois made a special plea for support of the
Caldwell case: “We want 500 Negroes who believe in Negro manhood, to
send immediately one dollar each to . . . Treasurer of the N. A. A. C. P.”225
With all measures exhausted, and Caldwell finally executed, Du Bois
stressed the community obligations imposed by Caldwell’s sacrifice:
No person who is conversant with . . . his case feels that he
was guilty of a crime when he fought to save his own life. No
red-blooded person would have done otherwise. Caldwell has
been sacrificed on the altar of prejudice. . . . His end means but
one more reason for a more unbending and relentless fight on
the part of every Negro . . . .226
Another perspective on the value of failed resistance emphasizes a more
nebulous community benefit. John Hope Franklin, the preeminent Black
historian of the twentieth century, describes his personal experience with this
theme in his assessment of the 1921 Tulsa riot. Franklin moved to Tulsa with
his family in 1925 at the age of ten and lived there until 1931.227 The Franklins
were on the cusp of moving to Tulsa when the riot interrupted their plans.
Modern presentations of the Tulsa riot are stories of “obliterat[ion]”
where one of America’s most prosperous Black communities was “reduced
to smoldering rubble.”228 Growing up in the community, Franklin recounts
a very different sense of the violence. Franklin’s account is one of heroic,
courageous Black resistance to racist terror. According to Franklin, many in
the Black community said that estimates of the casualties were manipulated:
that “many more whites were killed during the riot than any whites were
willing to admit.”229 Franklin speculated about the evidence of this
undercounting while shadowing his father’s law practice. The estate cases
of “some white person who died on or about June 1, 1921” were of special
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interest. “One was always tempted to conclude that the deceased lost his
life in the riot.”231
Franklin acknowledged the possibility that the lore in the Black
community about the casualty counts may have been embellished. But that
lore had its “desired effect” in establishing that the Blacks of Tulsa were
heroes who fought bravely against long odds.232 The impact, said Franklin,
was dramatic, and intensely personal.
Everyone who experienced the race riot in Tulsa or was touched
by it in some way, as I was, had his own view of what happened,
what was the aftermath, and what were the long-range
consequences. When I arrived in Tulsa, . . . the collective
wisdom in the black community had made certain conclusions
about the riot[,] . . . [including] that many more whites were
killed . . . than any whites were willing to admit. . . .
These conclusions seemed necessary for the continued
self-esteem of Tulsa’s black community. Whether or not the
conclusions were valid, they had the desired effect. The
self-confidence of Tulsa’s Negroes soared, their businesses
prospered, their institutions flourished, and they simply had no
fear of whites. . . . Such an attitude had a great deal to do with
eradicating the fear that a Negro boy growing up in Tulsa
might have felt in the years following the riot.233
Roy Wilkins expresses the same theme in his 1936 editorial, “Two
Against 5,000”234—the story of the lynching of William Wales and his sister,
Cora. Yes, the Waleses were ultimately burned by the mob.235 But Wilkins
renders their resistance as heroic and as a source of Black pride.236 “Two
Against 5,000” was Wilkins’s first published work as the official editor of
The Crisis.237 The title of the essay was the first item on the front page of the
June 1936 issue.238 It was Wilkins’s inaugural statement and a powerful
endorsement of armed self-defense.
230
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The root of the violence was white designs on property occupied by
William and Cora Wales.239 The Waleses resisted, and, finally, the
“time-worn device of dragging some white woman into the quarrel and
charging [William] Wales with threatening her” was deployed.240 This led
to a confrontation between the sheriff and William Wales that ended with
the sheriff shot dead.241
The shooting framed the core policy question, “Does The Crisis mean
to imply by this article that its policy is to defend colored people who kill
sheriffs?” Through smoothly honed consideration of self-defense policy in
the face of state failure and public unrest, Wilkins answered, “Yes, The
Crisis defends William and Cora Wales.”242
Doubting that “lynching” fully captured the scene, Wilkins sarcastically
described the violence as “sport on a grand scale. Hunting ’possum
compared to this is tiddlewinks. . . . Here were a man and a woman cooped
up in a frame house and all one had to do was shoot.”243 Then, Wilkins
pressed home the virtue of resistance against the mob.
“There was a slight flaw in the setup however. The man and woman had
arms and they were not afraid to shoot. … Not so good. Not half as good as
one lone Negro with nothing but his bare hands easily dangled at the end of
a rope . . . . A hanging, manacled Negro cannot shoot back. No, this was a
different proposition.”244
Wilkins’s contrast of heroic resistance against the grim alternative
makes the case that even failed resistance is superior to submission; that its
value extends beyond just the broader set of chances it bestows on mob
targets. It generates an important cultural asset, inexorably nebulous but
vitally important.
B. The Forbidden Zone
Another appeal of the Freedom Movement Defense Policy as a
guidepost for our twenty-first century conversation is its emphatic rejection
of political violence and plain delineation of a space where armed violence
is forbidden. This is a space where the prerogative of individual self-defense
is subordinated to group goals. The prime example of this space is the
organized public protest, pressing group goals.
Martin Luther King distilled the multiple iterations of the boundaries.
While Movement policy endorsed self-defense, it rejected political violence
239
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violence “as a tool of advancement, organized as in warfare, deliberately
and consciously.”245 Political goals must be achieved by “socially organized
masses on the march.”246 Wilkins embellished King’s rendition of the
forbidden zone, emphatically rejecting “aggressive, [premediated]”
violence.247
This model naturally condemned criminal violence in the deployment of
the core movement tool—the protest march.248 Roy Wilkins’s account of the
unrest of 1964 underscores the point. Barry Goldwater was seeking the
presidency on the Republican ticket.249 Wilkins met with King, Whitney
Young, A. Philip Randolph, James Farmer, and John Lewis to discuss
strategy.250 Wilkins articulated the worry that that violence in the streets
would create a backlash and play into the hands of Goldwater and George
Wallace.251 At the end of July, the group
called for a moratorium on mass marches, picketing and
demonstrations until Election Day. This was a major sacrifice. Our
goal was to secure justice and equality as well law and order. We
made it plain that we did not approve of looting, vandalism, or any
other type of criminal action, and drew a sharp line between those
kinds of violence and the legitimate protest of citizens denied their
rights. What appalled us most was the idea that white racists might
succeed in equating the summer riots with the demonstrations that
had been so vital to civil rights progress in the South.252

Among the legion of problems with political violence was that it
thwarted a coherent political message. Wilkins illustrated this through a
245
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Id. at 312.
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critique of a Newsweek reporter’s attempt to explain the 1964 violence in
Watts.253 The reporter’s chosen representative, a seemingly random
teenager, explained things this way: “You jes’ take an’ run, an’ you burn
when they ain’t nothin’ to take. You burn whitey, man. You burn his tail up
so he know what it’s all about.”254 Wilkins’s reaction was a mixture of “grief
. . . or [] anger. . . . There was no real philosophy, no law, not even any easily
comprehensible sociology behind the riot.”255 Wilkins worried that the
violence was an opening for repression, and he feared that “whites would
fail to distinguish rioters from real civil rights demonstrators.”256
Du Bois expressed this same concern early on with admonition against
political violence after the 1919 Chicago Race Riot.257 Rejection of political
violence also was imbedded in the NAACP’s litigation strategy.258 The
defense of Pink Franklin, Edgar Caldwell, Fleta Mathies, and Ossian Sweet
all rested on the same principle of righteous self-defense by individuals
forced into violence as a last resort.259
Sometimes, though, things are more complicated. The next section
shows how the Freedom Movement Defense Policy recognizes and
accommodates a contestable zone of circumstances where claims of
legitimate gun use are highly contingent.
C. The Danger Zone of Contestable Circumstances
For the most part, Freedom Movement Defense Policy presents fairly
stark choices—resistance versus submission, self-defense versus political
violence. But there is a zone of contestable scenarios where the
decision-making is fraught with difficult judgments. That space is
epitomized by the tactical disagreements surrounding continuation of James
Meredith’s 1966 Mississippi March Against Fear.260
Meredith’s march started in early June, as a nearly solitary effort.261
After Meredith was shot from ambush on the second day, Movement leaders
253
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rushed to the scene and committed to continuing the march. The initial
spirit of cooperation quickly dissolved into conflict.
The role of the Deacons for Defense, a grassroots armed defense group
that was gaining membership across the South, was a primary point of
contention and ultimately a deal-breaker for Roy Wilkins and Whitney
Young (President of the National Urban League).263 The worry was evident
when Deacons piled out of cars in Memphis carrying guns.264 Deacons
marching with guns was beyond the core case of self-defense and risked
altercations that opponents could characterize as dreaded political
violence.265 The NAACP and Urban League refused to participate.266
Ultimately, the Deacons would not march, but remained in the
background, guarding campsites and the march route.267 There would be no
public images of marchers carrying guns. But the risk was still too grave for
Wilkins and Young. Martin Luther King, Jr. and SCLC sided with Stokely
Carmichael and others to proceed with the march, guarded by the Deacons.268
In terms of pragmatic policy implementation, Wilkins’s approach was
the most rigidly conservative. King, on the other hand, struck a balance that
adds a layer of texture to the policy. Continuing the march after Meredith
had just been shot was risky. There were good reasons to distrust local or
state governments to protect the marchers. King’s many statements and
general practice shows that he was strongly committed to nonviolent protest.
But, as a practical matter, his options were limited. He had no power to bar
the Deacons from the scene. The alternative would be the Wilkins approach
of exiting the event.269
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King’s willingness to continue the march with the Deacons in the
background illuminates a contestable space within the Freedom Movement
Defense Policy. The protest march was a core movement tool. This was the
forbidden zone where violence was taboo.270 On the other hand, the March
Against Fear was unusual in the sense that it was a continuation of an event
where the leader had been shot on the street and the prospect of government
protection was dubious. Wilkins’s refusal to participate was a risk averse,
conservative application of the Freedom Movement policy. King’s approach
reflected the fact that this was an unusual circumstance, in a contestable
space at the margins, where stark choices give way to contingent
decision-making that is highly circumstantial.
The contingency of decision-making within this space and the potential
for fair disagreement about these scenarios is underscored by the other things
we know about Wilkins and King. King’s nonviolent stance is legendary.
But, his openness on the subject early in the movement is illustrated by a
variety of accounts, including the report from 1956 that the parsonage in
Montgomery was “an arsenal.”271
Wilkins’s subsequent reflections about the March Against Fear add
texture. With the polish of hindsight, Wilkins explained his decision to exit
this way:
I still believe that the way SNCC and CORE took over the
Meredith march was a tragedy for the civil rights movement.
Scores of organizations might otherwise have been encouraged
to rally around the Civil Rights Bill. Instead, Stokely set off
down the road . . . for Jackson, with Dr. King in tow, to draw
crowds and reporters. In Greenwood, Mississippi, Stokely got
up and yelled, “The only way we gonna stop them white men
from whuppin’ us is to take over. . . . We been sayin’ freedom
for six years and we got nothin’. What we gonna start saying
now is ‘Black Power.’” Those two words . . . . Black power was
just a slogan, loaded words, not a real program, but it
crystallized resentments that had been building for years . . . .
The phrase couldn’t have been more destructive if Senator
Eastland had contrived it. I imagine he sat there saying to
himself, “Now why didn’t I think of that?”272
King’s response after the stop in Greenwood further illuminates the
contingency of decision-making in the contestable zone. Troubled by the
escalating rhetoric of “Black Power,” King declared wearily that he was
270
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“sick and tired of violence” and pleaded with SNCC and CORE to send the
Deacons home and abandon the inflammatory rhetoric of Black Power.273
The next turn in the story underscores the difficulties within this space.
If FBI surveillance reports are to be believed, several weeks after the
Greenwood rally, King assented to as many as forty Deacons providing
security for a July 29 speech in Chicago on the condition that they not be
identified as members of the group.274
Notwithstanding their disagreement surrounding the March Against
Fear, King and Wilkins ultimately seemed in clear agreement about how the
Freedom Movement Defense Policy intersected with the burgeoning Black
Power movement.275 In August 1966, Movement leaders and emerging
Black radicals appeared on the Sunday weekly news show, Meet the Press,
to discuss the newly minted slogan, “Black Power.”276 King, Wilkins,
Whitney M. Young, Jr., Floyd B. McKissick, Stokely Carmichael, and
James H. Meredith represented the longstanding position of the
Movement.277 The detailed presentation defined the space of legitimate
self-defense that Movement policy always had endorsed.278 But King was
adamant that the Movement could not tolerate violence in the forbidden
zone, and he worried about phrasing that blurred the line between legitimate
self-defense and self-defeating political violence:
On the question of defensive violence, I have made it clear that I
don’t think we need programmatic action around defensive
violence. People are going to defend themselves anyway. . . . I
think the minute you have programmatic action around defensive
violence . . . the line of demarcation between defensive violence
and aggressive violence becomes very thin.279
Wilkins also fervently rejected political violence endorsed by Carmichael
and Meredith: “[N]o one believes that the Negro minority in this country is
going to take up arms to try to rectify every wrong that has been done [to] the
Negro.”280 Later, at the NAACP annual convention, Wilkins pressed the
policy home.281 Declarations about self-defense urged by CORE and other
groups were “not new as far as the NAACP is concerned. Historically, our
Association has defended in court those persons who have defended
273
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themselves and their homes with firearms.” But the worrisome implications
of the Black Power chant implied a Black equivalent of white terrorism, “a
reverse Ku Klux Klan. We of the NAACP will have none of this.”283
Looking back, Wilkins ultimately would describe himself as a more
aggressive proponent of self-defense than King.284 Considering what we can
observe about Wilkins and King over time, if we could repeat the
experiment, it is unclear whether either of them would make the same
decisions surrounding the March Against Fear. This demonstrates the
importance of the general acknowledgment of a contestable danger zone
where entering with arms is both understandable and risky, a space where
claims of legitimacy will be highly fact dependent.
D. The Normative Case for Using Freedom Movement Defense Policy as a
Model for Thinking About Private Arms During Civil Unrest
The normative case for using Freedom Movement Defense Policy as a
guidepost for thinking about private arms in the context of modern civil
unrest is multifaceted. To start, the policy offers a compelling context for
evaluating the continuing question: whether civil unrest is an excuse for
curtailing private arms. One natural instinct is that the right to arms during
civil unrest is more problematic than isolated episodes of individual
self-defense. From the state’s perspective this may be true. Keeping and
restoring order seems more problematic when private antagonists are armed.
Movement Defense Policy privileges the perspective of the victim and her
class, for whom armed defense against mobs is arguably more compelling
than defense against random attacks by individuals. The mob can be an
instrument of terror when it targets people because of their group identity. It
assaults and instills fear in the whole group just by injuring a few of the
members. Resistance cuts the other way. It combats terror directly by
confronting the immediate aggressors and indirectly by sending a general
message that mobbing is risky.
Separately, Freedom Movement Defense Policy has a solid political
pedigree. It stands on English common law and the idea of castle.285 Roy
Wilkins explicitly invoked this tradition in assessment of the Sweet case,
which, even decades later, he still considered the most important housing
case of the 1920s.286 The policy also fits comfortably within the
transformation wrought by the Fourteenth Amendment. By 1868, the focus
282
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of the constitutional right to arms was individual self-defense.
The
nettlesome militia theme, with its undercurrent of identifying and
overthrowing tyranny through armed political violence, had receded.288 This
grounding is particularly apt for purposes of the modern debate because the
Fourteenth Amendment is the conduit for application of the national right to
arms to the states, and state and local governments conduct much of the
government response to civil unrest.289
Finally, decision-making in the midst of civil unrest is often clouded by
the clamor of the moment. Analysis grounded on Freedom Movement
Defense Policy can diminish that impediment through reference to
well-seasoned precedents that still address the interests and claims of
modern stake holders.
The core elements are straightforward. First, Movement Defense Policy
validates a bounded sphere of legitimate defense against mobs by people
who are literally or figuratively backed to the wall, people like the defenders
at Atlanta—Du Bois, White, and Wright—who took their stand against the
mob in a space where retreat cannot be demanded.
287
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Second, the policy allows easy condemnation of armed political
violence in the forbidden zone. This is the “aggressive,” “premeditated,”
“organized, deliberate violence deployed as a political tool” condemned by
King and Wilkins.290 As Wilkins emphasized, looting and vandalism in
connection with the core movement tool—the protest march—is plain subset
of this prohibited activity.291
Third, by framing the circumstances about which we can fairly
disagree—activity within the danger zone of contestable arms bearing and
use—the policy sounds a clear alarm of warning.292 Individuals or groups who
enter the public space armed, under politically heated circumstances—where
fighting words and physical confrontation are easily foreseeable—take
tremendous risks.293 Citizens who venture out of their homes into protest
environments with the goal of “ensuring order” take even greater risks.294 The
possibility that the state might fail in its role of providing security in that space
may be real and claims that arms use was defensive and legitimate ultimately
might prevail.295 But, self-defense claims in this context will virtually never
present the clean, easy, model case. Those who venture armed into this danger
zone, even with the best of intentions, should expect criticism, heavy scrutiny,
and possibly prosecution and conviction.296
CONCLUSION
The core interests of individuals facing imminent threats transcends time
and race. There are no important distinctions between the terror that fueled
the Freedom Movement Defense Policy and the turmoil of the twenty-first
century. It helps order our conversations about the legitimacy and scope of
arms bearing during periods of civil unrest in a principled way, and in
a manner that credits the core interests of modern stakeholders, and
simultaneously extracts us from the mire of immediate circumstances.
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